“Laurence D. Fink, the founder and chief executive of the investment giant BlackRock, has become one of the most influential voices in business over the past decade in pushing corporate leaders to think beyond profits, to their social purpose.
Mr. Fink has delivered his words in annual letters that have drawn remarkable attention, but also criticism from all corners: that he is beholden to politically correct antibusiness activists, or that he is co-opting these issues for marketing purposes.
On Monday night, he used his latest letter to corporate America to clarify — and defend — his approach.
“Stakeholder capitalism is not about politics,” Mr. Fink wrote to the chief executives of businesses that BlackRock has invested in. “It is not ‘woke.’ It is capitalism.” “
So what are NFTs?
In the simplest terms, NFTs transform digital works of art and other collectibles into one-of-a-kind, verifiable assets that are easy to trade on the blockchain.
Although that may be far from simple for the uninitiated to understand, the payoff has been huge for many artists, musicians, influencers and the like, with investors spending top dollar to own NFT versions of digital images. For example, Jack Dorsey’s first tweet sold for $2.9 million
, a video clip of a LeBron James slam dunk sold for over $200,000 and a decade-old “Nyan Cat” GIF went for $600,000
Source: What is NFT? Non-fungible tokens explained – CNN
The Bayh–Dole Act or Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act (Pub. L. 96-517, December 12, 1980) is United States legislation dealing with inventions arising from federal government-funded research. Sponsored by two senators, Birch Bayh of Indiana and Bob Dole of Kansas, the Act was adopted in 1980, is codified at 94 Stat. 3015, and in 35 U.S.C. § 200–212, and is implemented by 37 C.F.R. 401 for federal funding agreements with contractors and 37 C.F.R 404 for licensing of inventions owned by the federal government.
A key change made by Bayh–Dole was in the procedures by which federal contractors that acquired ownership of inventions made with federal funding could retain that ownership. Before the Bayh–Dole Act, the Federal Procurement Regulation required the use of a patent rights clause that in some cases required federal contractors or their inventors to assign inventions made under contract to the federal government unless the funding agency determined that the public interest was better served by allowing the contractor or inventor to retain principal or exclusive rights. The National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, and the Department of Commerce had implemented programs that permitted non-profit organizations to retain rights to inventions upon notice without requesting an agency determination. By contrast, Bayh–Dole uniformly permits non-profit organizations and small business firm contractors to retain ownership of inventions made under contract and which they have acquired, provided that each invention is timely disclosed and the contractor elects to retain ownership in that invention. 
A second key change with Bayh-Dole was to authorize federal agencies to grant exclusive licenses to inventions owned by the federal government.
Source: Bayh–Dole Act – Wikipedia
To summarize, the rights to act by written consent and to call a special meeting are very similar in what they allow shareholders to do. This fact may seem
to support the commonly held view that shareholders that already have the right
to call a special meeting do not also need the right to act by written consent. But
looking only at what the two rights allow shareholders to do—and not at what
restrictions boards can place on those rights—is a mistake.
Contrary to popular opinion, the right to act by written consent is more empowering to shareholders than the right to call a special meeting, because boards
cannot unilaterally impose the same type of restrictions on the latter as they can
on the former. A review of the corporate governance documents of large Delaware companies demonstrates the significance of this distinction. Boards have,
with little oversight or fanfare, significantly restricted shareholders’ exercise of
their special-meeting right. However, companies have generally not imposed
similar restrictions on shareholders’ exercise of their written-consent right.
179. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
180. Lipton et al., supra note 63.
special meetings and consent solicitations
Thus, even though the two rights can be used to accomplish similar actions, the
written-consent right is used far more frequently than the special-meeting right
to conduct fights for board control.
This article seems to think action by written consent is mostly useful.
“Shareholder action by written consent refers to corporate shareholders’ right to act by written consent instead of a meeting. This type of consent avoids some of the negative characteristics of shareholder meetings. A consent resolution, formally called a Shareholders’ Consent to Action Without Meeting, is a written document that details and validates the procedures taken by shareholders within a corporation without requiring that a meeting occur between shareholders and/or directors.
In general, written shareholder consents require the same number of approval votes as would be required if the shareholder meeting actually occurred. Keep in mind that it’s not necessary for a meeting to actually be in person these days either, as telephone and video meetings are common and may be included as acceptable methods of holding meetings according to a corporation’s bylaws. . . . ”
Source: Shareholder Action by Written Consent
“. . . Under Delaware law, shareholder action may be taken by written consent in lieu of a meeting unless the certificate of incorporation either expressly prohibits action by consent or effectively prohibits it by requiring that such action be taken only by unanimous consent.  Written consent proposals seek to have the board propose a charter amendment to permit action by written consent. Action by written consent may be used to accomplish, among other acts, the wholesale amendment of bylaws and, absent specific impediments in the certificate of incorporation, removal of directors without cause and filling of board vacancies, all without waiting for an annual or special meeting. As a result, except in limited instances such as where the charter prevents the removal of directors without cause, the right to act by written consent may be used to replace up to the entire board of directors. Among other things, the ability to gain control of the board can undermine takeover defenses, such as a shareholder rights plan, and thereby potentially prevent the board from using a rights plan or other defensive mechanism to explore alternative ways of realizing value for shareholders. The vulnerabilities that arise from the existence of the right to act by written consent, even if not actually exploited, arguably give hostile bidders and insurgent shareholders leverage whenever they are negotiating with incumbent boards. . . .”
This article doesn’t make me an authority on this complicated subject.
Source: Action by Written Consent: A New Focus for Shareholder Activism